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to	which	 the	ECJ	continues	 to	act	 in	ways	which	are	 transformational	even	though	the	 legal	order	
itself	has	remained	relatively	static.	The	EU	citizenship	 jurisprudence	serves	as	a	useful	example	of	
how	 integration	 is	 driven	 forward	 by	 the	 Court.	 This	 article	 argues	 that	 the	 Court’s	 decisions	 do	
continue	 to	 have	 significant	 impact	 on	 areas	 of	 law	 and	 policy	 and	 EU	 governance	 generally.	 It	
illustrates	 this	 argument	 using	 gender	 equality	 law	 and	 Human	 Rights	 as	 pertinent	 examples	 and	
concludes	 that	 the	 ECJ	 remains	 relevant	 in	 governance	 terms	 as	 it	 continues	 to	 drive	 forward	 EU	









effect	 in	 those	Member	 States.	While	 a	 significant	 amount	 of	 literature	 has	 been	 devoted	 to	 the	
Court’s	jurisprudence	and	key	decisions	have	been	analysed	in	detail	 in	the	legal	literature,	the	ECJ	
has	 received	 relatively	 little	attention	 from	a	political	or	governance	perspective.2	 The	article	 thus	
begins	 with	 a	 brief	 assessment	 of	 the	 early	 case	 law	 which	 transformed	 the	 treaties	 into	 an	
integrated	legal	order	applicable	directly	in	Member	States	and	argues	that	without	these	decisions	
EU	governance	would	look	very	different	today.	The	focus	on	case	law	is	important	as	it	 is	through	







the	 ECJ	 but	 also	 its	 case	 law	 more	 generally	 and	 why,	 rather	 than	 curbing	 the	 Court’s	 power,	
Member	 States	 have	 instead	 allowed	 it	 to	 expand	 into	more	 and	more	 areas.	 Finally,	 the	 article	
																																								 																				
1	Now	of	course	it	is	more	accurate	to	refer	to	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	as	an	umbrella	term	covering	the	
ECJ,	 the	General	 Court	 and	 specialist	 tribunals.	 For	 ease	 of	 reference,	 the	 term	 ECJ	 is	 used	 throughout	 this	 article	 and	
although	this	is	mostly	accurate,	it	is	acknowledged	that	the	exact	meaning	of	that	term	has	changed	over	time.	






or	whether	 it	 has	 continued	 to	 change	 the	 legal	 and	 political	 landscape.	 Although	 the	 legal	 order	
itself	has	remained	fairly	static	following	the	early	transformation,	the	Court	remains	active	and	has	
continued	 to	make	 decisions	which	 transform	 certain	 policy	 areas	 and	 embrace	 certain	modes	 of	







represented	 by	 EU	 law	 specialist	 lawyers,	 and	 this	 increasing	 role	 of	 lawyers	 and	 Courts	 in	 the	
regulation	of	EU	matters	is	seen	by	some	to	be	a	move	towards	American	style	adversarial	legalism,	
with	 the	 emergent	 version	 in	 the	 EU	 being	 termed	 as	 Eurolegalism.3	 Eurolegalism,	 so	 Kelemen	
argues,	 is	 the	 result	 of	 fragmented	 governmental	 and	 economic	 power	 and	 is	 in	 fact	 a	 far	more	
important	mode	of	governance	in	the	EU	than	so-called	modes	of	new	governance	which	are	dealt	
with	in	detail	by	both	Michelle	Cini	and	Ingeborg	Tömmel4	in	their	contributions	to	this	special	issue.	
Whether	 or	 not	 Kelemen‘s	 view	 is	 justified	 is	 open	 for	 debate,	 but	 his	 argument	 does	 raise	 the	
question	of	how	a	set	of	treaties	setting	out	international	law	obligations	between	signatory	states	





governed	 by	 politics	 rather	 than	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 The	 exchange	 between	 Garrett5	 and	 Mattli	 &	
Slaughter6	sets	out	the	arguments	for	those	respective	positions	clearly	but,	as	Karen	Alter7	notes,	
there	 now	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 consensus	 that	 the	 truth	 lies	 somewhere	 between	 those	 two	positions;	
with	 the	 Court	 having	 significant	 autonomy	 without	 being	 immune	 to	 political	 processes	 and	
Member	State	or	EU	institutional	interests.		
Principles	which	are	key	to	the	functioning	of	the	EU	legal	order	as	we	now	know	it	cannot	be	found	
in	 the	 Treaties,	 certainly	 not	 the	 early	 ones	 as	 Shaw	 notes:	 ‘[The	 Treaty	 provisions]	 give	 no	 hint,	
however,	that	the	obligations	undertaken	by	the	Member	States	under	the	Treaties	they	have	signed	
are	 relevant	 at	 any	 level	 other	 than	 that	 of	 international	 law’.8	 Fennelly	 makes	 the	 same	 point,	
																																								 																				
3	Daniel	R.	 Kelemen,	 Eurolegalism	The	Transformation	of	 Law	and	Regulation	 in	 the	European	Union,	 (London:	Harvard	
University	Press,	2011).	
4	Michelle	Cini,	 ‘Good	Governance	and	 Institutional	Change:	Administrative	Ethics	Reform	in	the	European	Commission’,	





















The	 case	 of	 Van	 Gend	 en	 Loos14	 is	 a	 ‘famous	 stepping	 stone	 of	 legal	 doctrine,	 but	 [also]	 a	
breakthrough	in	the	political	relationship	between	member	states	and	the	club’15		as	it	turned	what	
was	 for	 all	 intents	 and	 purposes	 an	 international	 legal	 framework	 into	 a	 new	 legal	 order	 which	
applied	not	only	at	international	level	between	Member	States	but	also	to	citizens	of	those	Member	
States.	 In	 1964,	 the	 Court	 built	 further	 on	 its	 decision	 in	 Van	 Gend	 and	 the	 ideas	 of	 direct	
applicability	(that	is	the	legal	mechanism	that	the	EU	Treaties	and	Regulations	apply	in	all	Member	
States	 without	 the	 need	 to	 be	 transposed	 into	 national	 law)	 and	 direct	 effect	 (that	 is	 the	 legal	
mechanism	 that	 individuals	 can	 rely	 directly	 on	EU	 law	 in	 their	 national	 Courts	 to	 enforce	 EU	 law	






the	protection	of	 the	rights	which	they	grant	would	be	weakened	 if	 individuals	were	
unable	 to	 obtain	 compensation	 when	 their	 rights	 are	 infringed	 by	 a	 breach	 of	
Community	law	for	which	a	Member	State	can	be	held	responsible.19	
By	the	1990s	therefore,	the	Member	States	had	been	‘judicially	tamed’20	and	the	ECJ	had	completed	



























also,	 of	 course,	 set	 the	 foundations	 for	 increasing	 judicialisation	 of	 EU	 policymaking	 and	 are	
instrumental	 in	 shaping	 modes	 of	 governance.	 Tömmel	 notes	 that	 the	 EU	 builds	 a	 system	 of	
‘governance	 of	 governance’;	 the	 ECJ,	 through	 its	 early	 case	 law,	 ensured	 that	 the	 system	 is	 one	
which	remains	open	to	judicial	scrutiny.		
It	 is	difficult	 to	know	whether	 the	 transformation	of	 the	 legal	order	and	 its	 impact	on	governance	
was	 intentional	or	accidental.	Mayer	argues	 that	 the	decision	 in	Van	Gend	en	Loos	 is	not	 likely	 to	
have	 seemed	 that	 dramatic	 to	 the	 judges	 at	 the	 time	 and	 was	 simply	 an	 attempt	 at	 creating	 a	








Whether	 or	 not	 Van	 Gend	 en	 Loos	was	 intended	 to	 transform	 the	 legal	 order,	 the	 case	 certainly	
changed	the	legal	landscape.	Arguably,	the	cases	that	came	next	were	less	about	transformation	and	
more	 about	 an	 evolution	 which	 consolidated	 the	 position	 established	 by	 Van	 Gend	 en	 Loos.	 The	
principles	 they	 established	 were	 presented	 on	 a	 case	 by	 case	 basis	 making	 the	 changes	 appear	
incremental	 and	 less	 radical.26	 For	 example	 the	 decisions	 on	 state	 liability	 came,	 for	 some,	 as	
another	 transformation	 and	 radical	 shift	 in	 how	 EU	 law	 should	 operate	 and	 how	Member	 States	
should	be	held	to	account	for	breaches	of	their	obligations.	However,	there	is	considerable	evidence	
that	this	decision	should	not	have	come	as	such	a	surprise.	The	Court	had	already	held	that	Member	
States	must	make	 good	 any	unlawful	 consequences	 of	 a	 breach	of	 Community	 law,27	 and	 a	 little	
later,	 in	 1973,	 the	 Court	 declared	 admissible	 an	 action	 for	 infringement	 of	 Member	 States’	
obligations	even	though	the	Member	State	had	remedied	 the	situation.28	Admissibility	was	based	























EU	 legal	 framework	 over	 time.	 This	 part	 of	 the	 article	 briefly	 considers	 the	 preliminary	 reference	
procedure	as	a	vital	part	of	this	relationship.	In	this	context,	it	has	been	noted	that	‘one	of	the	most	
important	 aspects	 of	 the	 Court’s	 contribution	 has	 been	 its	 characterization	 of	 the	 relationship	
between	 the	 EU	 and	 national	 law’.29	 In	 what	 Mancini	 called	 an	 ‘exercise	 of	 remarkable	 judicial	
creativity’,30	 the	Court	distanced	 itself	 from	established	 international	 law	principles	and	developed	
an	 ‘organic	 connection	between	 the	Court	of	 Justice	and	 the	national	Courts’31	 in	 the	 form	of	 the	
preliminary	 reference	 procedure.	 As	 well	 as	 being	 important	 for	 the	 development	 of	 ECJ	
jurisprudence	 and	 its	 political	 and	 legal	 credibility	 because	 it	 provides	 a	 link	 between	 the	 EU	 and	
national	Courts	and	encourages	the	 interpretation	of	key	 legal	concepts,	the	preliminary	reference	
procedure	 and	 the	 way	 it	 has	 been	 used	 also	 helps	 explain	 the	 development	 of	 EU	 law	 in	 the	
Member	States	and	their	acceptance	of	it.	
For	more	than	40	years,	this	system	has	successfully	managed	the	myriad	complexities	
of	 legal	 integration.	 It	 has	 also	 heavily	 conditioned	 legislative	 outcomes	 in	 a	 wide	
range	 of	 policy	 domains,	 and	 it	 has	 helped	 to	 determine	 the	 course	 of	 European	
integration	more	generally.	But	the	system	has	never	been	‘perfected’.	It	has	evolved	









integration	 forward	and	developing	policy	areas	 is	 the	 relatively	high	number	of	 cases	brought	by	
citizens	 which	 raise	 EU	 law	 questions,	 have	 been	 referred	 to	 the	 ECJ	 and	 which	 have	 therefore	
allowed	the	ECJ	to	interpret	areas	as	it	sees	fit.33	However,	for	the	EU	legal	system	to	develop	in	the	
way	that	it	did,	it	had	to	be	accepted	by	the	Courts	of	the	Member	States.	The	preliminary	reference	








ignoring	 the	principle	of	 supremacy	of	 EU	 law.	 There	was,	 and	 to	 some	extent	 still	 is,	 therefore	 a	











important	 constitutional	 principles	 and	 decide	 key	 cases,	 and	 who,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 potentially	
unpopular	decisions,	is	willing	to	do	so.34	Overall	though,	‘in	practice,	the	relationship	between	the	
Court	of	Justice	and	the	national	Courts,	including	supreme	Courts,	has	worked	reasonably	well’.35		




law	 to	 the	 ECJ	 gives	 lower	 Courts	 considerable	 power	 and	 the	 ECJ	 has	 always	 protected	 lower	
Courts’	right	to	refer.	By	giving	the	lower	Courts	a	stake	in	the	EU	legal	order,	the	ECJ	has	avoided	
constant	 power	 struggles	with	 supreme	or	 constitutional	 Courts	 and	 has	 opened	 an	 avenue	 for	 a	
steady	stream	of	cases	which	 in	 turn	normalises	 the	process	and	 leads	to	acceptance	of	EU	 law	 in	
Member	 States.	 It,	 of	 course,	 also	 leads	 to	 increased	 judicialisation	 of	 EU	 integration	 and	
policymaking	because	it	is	the	ECJ,	through	the	national	Courts,	which	is	expanding	the	scope	of	EU	
law	and	policy.	The	statistics	show	that	in	most	Member	States,	significantly	more	references	come	










respective	 substantive	 areas	 such	 as	 Baumbast37	 or	 recently	 Zambrano38	 (closely	 followed	 by	
McCarthy39	and	Dereci40)	in	relation	to	citizenship,	Coleman41	in	relation	to	discrimination	law,	and	
Hoefner	v	Macroton	GmbH42	 in	 relation	to	competition	 law	for	example,	 there	have	not	been	any	
decisions	which	have	made	significant	changes	to	the	legal	order	itself.	Since	Van	Gend	en	Loos,	the	
legal	order	has	 remained	 fairly	static	with	 the	ECJ	claiming	authority	 to	define	 important	concepts	
and	questions	and	extending	the	reach	of	direct	effect	into	more	and	more	areas.	However,	some	of	
its	decisions	do	have	a	significant	impact	on	questions	of	governance.	
The	 citizenship	 jurisprudence,	 for	 example,	 provides	 an	 example	 of	 the	 ECJ’s	 expansive	
interpretations	 of	 EU	 law	 and	 its	 willingness	 or	 even	 desire	 to	 push	 the	 development	 forward	
																																								 																				
34	Imelda	Maher,	‘National	Courts	as	European	Community	Courts’,	Legal	Studies,	14(2)	(1994):	226-243;	Alec	Stone	Sweet,	
The	 Judicial	 Construction	 of	 Europe,	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	 2004);	 M.	 Kumm,	 ‘The	 Jurisprudence	 of	



















Policing	 the	 constitutional	 retrenchment	 of	 public	 finances	 is	 an	 unusual	 role	 for	 a	
Court.	 However,	 in	 the	 ECJ’s	 case	 it	 is	 not	 a	 one-off	 role,	 and	 the	 new	 task	 is	




this	 special	 issue,	 Sandra	 Eckert	 provides	 a	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 regulatory	 governance	 in	 the	
energy	 and	 competition	 sectors	which	 provides	 valuable	 insights.45	 Suffice	 it	 to	 say	 here	 that	 the	
ECJ’s	acceptance	of	soft	law	instruments	allows	and	facilitates	the	coming	together	of	various	modes	
of	 governance	 mixing	 the	 traditional	 community	 method	 with	 new	 modes	 of	 governance,	 and	
placing	 soft	 law	 instruments	on	a	 firm	constitutional	 footing	using	general	 legal	principles	 such	as	
legal	 certainty.46 The	 ECJ	 has	 therefore	 acknowledged	 and	 accepted	 the	 multi-level,	 often	 non-
hierarchical	modes	of	governance	discussed	in	detail	in	Ingeborg	Tömmel’s	contribution.		
	It	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	article	to	explore	all	of	these	areas	and	indeed	the	contributions	to	this	




of	 gender	 equality.	 Prechal	 commented:	 ‘Gender	 equality	 law	 has	 played	 a	 pivotal	 –	 in	 many	
respects	pioneer	–	role	in	the	field	of	enforcement	of	Community	law	in	general	and	in	particular	for	
the	protection	of	 rights,	which	 individuals	derive	 from	that	 law’.47	This	area	 therefore	serves	as	a	
useful	 example	 to	 illustrate	 the	 ECJ’s	 transformational	 role	 and	 explore	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 this	
transformation	 is	 part	 of	 a	 grand	 plan	 to	 drive	 EU	 integration	 and	 favour	 particular	 modes	 of	
governance.	The	case	of	Defrenne	II48	provided	the	first	example	of	directly	effective	Treaty	rights	
being	 enforceable	 against	 a	 private	 institution	 (or	 person)	 rather	 than	 a	Member	 State	 and	 as	 a	
result	citizens	benefit	from	a	highly	effective	mechanism	to	enforce	EU	Law	rights	through	national	
Courts.	The	impact	on	governance	is	clear:	cases	result	in	national	legislation	which	is	under	scrutiny	







Coordination	and	Governance.	Yet	 its	 record	as	a	 judicial	 institution	has	been	 little	scrutinised’	EUROPP	entry	posted	on	
March	 7,	 2012,	 http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/03/07/european-Court-of-justice-enforcer/	 [accessed	 26	 July	
2013].	
















only	 where	 some	 gain	 can	 be	 obtained	 in	 terms	 of	 reinforcing	 its	 own	 legitimacy	 within	 the	
system’.54	 The	move	 to	 transform	equality	 law	 in	Defrenne	 II55	and	 cases	 that	 followed	may	 thus	
have	 rather	 more	 to	 do	 with	 the	 ECJ’s	 awareness	 of	 its	 own	 position	 within	 the	 EU	 institutional	
framework	than	with	a	predominant	concern	with	gender	equality.56	The	ECJ	has	clearly	shown	an	
awareness	of	its	position	and	the	possibility	that	its	powers	may	be	limited	by	Treaty	and	that	there	
is	 thus	 a	 need	 to	 safeguard	 its	 position	 and	 not	 be	 seen	 to	 make	 decisions	 with	 significant	 and	
potentially	 costly	 consequences	 for	 Member	 States.	 Once	 such	 balancing	 act	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	
cases	relating	to	pensions	and	equal	pay.57	Once	the	ECJ	had	concluded	that	Article	119	had	direct	
effect	and	that	occupational	pensions	were	included	in	the	definitions	of	pay,	the	Council	attempted	
to	 limit	 the	 severe	 financial	 consequences	 for	 many	 employers	 by	 issuing	 Directive	 86/37858	 on	
pensions	 which	 gave	 Member	 States	 time	 to	 implement	 the	 effects	 of	 equal	 pay	 legislation	 on	
pensions.	 In	 Barber	 v	 Guardian	 Royal	 Exchange,59	 the	 ECJ	 essentially	 overruled	 that	 Directive	 by	
stating	 that	 differences	 in	 pensionable	 age	 based	 on	 sex	 were	 discriminatory	 and	 had	 to	 be	
eliminated;	 the	 ECJ	 did	 however	 limit	 the	 retrospective	 effect	 of	 that	 decision.	 Nonetheless,	 the	
Member	 States’	 governments	 reacted	 strongly	 to	 a	 decision	 with	 potentially	 crippling	 financial	
implications	for	employers,	they	added	a	protocol	to	the	Maastricht	Treaty60	and	that	protocol	limits	
the	application	of	the	principle	of	equal	treatment	to	any	work	after	the	Barber	decision.	The	ECJ	did	

















56	 Jesscia	Guth,	 ‘Law	as	 the	Object	 and	Agent	of	 Integration:	Gendering	 the	Court	of	 Justice	of	 the	European	Union,	 its	
decisions	 and	 their	 impact’,	 in	 Gabriele	 Abels	 and	 Heather	 MacRae	 (eds),	 Gendering	 European	 Integration	 Theory:	
Engaging	New	Dialogues,	(Leverkusen:	Barbara	Budrich	Verlag,	2015).	
57	 See	Case	80/70,	Defrenne	v.	Belgium	 [1971]	ECR	445,	Case	43/75,	Defrenne	v.	 SABENA	 [1976]	ECR	455,	Case	170/84,	
Bilka	Kaufhaus	GmbH	v.	 von	Hartz	 [1986]	 ECR	1607	and	Case	262/88,	Barber	 v.	Guardian	Royal	 Exchange	 [1990]	 ECR	 I-















theoretically	 far	 reaching	 and	 supportive	 of	 gender	 equality,	 they	 are	 quite	 limited	 in	 practice,	
making	them	more	acceptable	to	the	Member	States.		
This	series	of	cases	shows	the	power	play	between	EU	institutions	and	between	the	ECJ	and	Member	
States	which	 sees	 the	 ECJ	 pushing	 the	 limits	 of	what	Member	 States	will	 accept	 but	 not	 pushing	
beyond	 those	 limits	 and	 risking	 a	 significant	 push	 back	 which	 may	 limit	 its	 power	 in	 the	 future.	
Nonetheless,	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	ECJ	has	been	instrumental	in	shifting	the	focus	of	EU	policy	
by	changing	the	weight	afforded	to	different	 issues	and	by	 insisting	on	expansive	 interpretation	of	
concepts	 such	 as	 pay,	 even	 if	 allowing	 the	 application	 of	 those	 principles	 to	 be	 time	 limited.	 The	
earlier	 economic	 focus	 of	 decisions	 gave	 way	 to	 social	 policy	 concerns	 with	 the	 ECJ	 declaring	 in	
Deutsche	Telekom	AG	that:	
the	 economic	 aim	 pursued	 by	 Article	 141	 of	 the	 treaty	 [on	 equal	 pay],	 namely	 the	
elimination	of	distortion	of	competition	between	undertakings	established	in	different	
Member	States	 is	 secondary	 to	 the	social	aim	pursued	by	 the	same	provision,	which	
constitutes	the	expression	of	a	fundamental	human	right.64		








recently.	 The	 result	might	well	 be	 increased	 rights-based	 litigation,	 thus	 increasing	 judicialisation.	
This	area	also	serves	as	an	example	of	how	the	ECJ	continues	to	try	and	safeguard	its	position	in	the	
institutional	 framework	and	 to	 try	and	ensure	 that	decisions	 remain	open	 to	 judicial	 scrutiny.	 The	
opinion	on	the	EU’s	accession	to	the	European	Convention,	delivered	by	a	 full	Court	at	 the	end	of	
2014,	 gives	 us	 some	 insight.66	 The	 ECJ	 notes	 that	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights	 (ECtHR)	
jurisprudence	would	be	binding	on	all	EU	institutions	including	the	ECJ	and	that	the	ECJ’s	rulings	on	
human	rights	issues	could	not	bind	the	ECtHR.	However,	the	ECJ	pointed	out	that	this	‘cannot	be	so	
as	 regards	 the	 interpretation	 which	 the	 Court	 itself	 provides	 of	 EU	 law	 and,	 in	 particular,	 of	 the	
Charter	of	 Fundamental	Rights	of	 the	European	Union’.67	 The	ECJ	went	on	 to	 consider	 the	 lack	of	
arrangements	 for	 dealing	 with	 the	 overlap	 in	 jurisdiction	 between	 the	 Courts	 and	 points	 to	 the	
possibility	 of	 undermining	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 preliminary	 reference	 procedure	 and	 the	













a	 question	 would	 be	 tantamount	 to	 conferring	 on	 it	 jurisdiction	 to	 interpret	 the	 case	 law	 of	 the	
Court	of	Justice’.68	The	ECJ	also	seems	less	than	impressed	that	the	ECtHR,	as	the	law	now	stands,	
would	 have	 jurisdiction	 to	 review	 certain	 acts/omissions	 which	 the	 ECJ	 currently	 does	 not	 have	
jurisdiction	 to	 review	 (mainly	 acts	 and	 omissions	 relating	 to	 Common	 Foreign	 and	 Security	 Policy	
matters)	noting	that:	
[t]he	 Court	 has	 already	 had	 occasion	 to	 find	 that	 jurisdiction	 to	 carry	 out	 a	 judicial	









due	 to	 questions	 being	 posed	 by	 Member	 States’	 Courts	 but	 are	 also	 influenced	 by	 the	 ECJ’s	
approach	 to	 the	 questions	 posed	 and	 the	 decisions	 they	 make	 as	 decisions	 are	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	
further	legal	development	and	possibly	litigation.70		
The	ECJ’s	reach	is	wide	in	scope.	There	are	no	policy	areas	with	which	the	Court	has	not	in	some	way	
engaged.	 As	 Jacobs	 notes,	 the	 EU	 ‘is	 based	 on	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 to	 a	 far	 greater	 extent	 than	 any	
previous	or	contemporary	international	or	transnational	organisation’.71	That	emphasis	on	the	rule	
of	law	and	the	importance	of	law	in	the	expansion	of	the	EU’s	remit,	has	led	to	policy	areas	evolving	













the	 legal	 order	 completely	 by	 declaring	 EU	 law	 supreme,	 directly	 applicable	 and	 often	 directly	





70	 There	 is	 a	 significant	 body	 of	 work	 around	 legal	 mobilisation	 which	 considers	 the	 impact	 on	 EU	 case	 law	 and	







order	 had	 been	 established,	 it	 was	 accepted	 by	 Member	 States	 partly	 because	 of	 the	 way	 the	
preliminary	reference	procedure	has	been	used	by	the	ECJ	to	protect	lower	national	Courts’	rights	to	
refer	questions,	 thus	giving	them	and	citizens	a	stake	 in	the	functioning	of	the	EU	 legal	order.	 It	 is	
therefore	 likely	 that	 the	 ECJ	 played	 a	 key	 role	 in	 instigating	 what	 Tömmel73	 has	 considered	 the	




the	 market	 was	 possible.	 Finally,	 the	 article	 considered	 whether	 the	 ECJ	 continues	 to	 be	
transformational	 and	 concluded	 that	 while	 it	 might	 continue	 to	 transform	 policy	 areas,	 the	 legal	
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73	Tömmel,	‘EU	Governance	of	Governance’.	
